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Roqer J. Miner
circuit Judqe

•

o.s.

The Reception of Foreign Law in the Federal Courts
American Foreign Law Association
Wednesday, May 17, 1995
Drake Hotel, New York City
Noon
I am very pleased for the opportunity to address the
American Foreign Law Association on the occasion of its 1995
annual meeting.

Since 1925, your Association has been at the

forefront in promoting the understanding and appreciation of
foreign, comparative and private international law.

As is well-

known, the membership of this organization is composed of
distinguished lawyers, judges and legal scholars who regularly
deal with legal issues that transcend national boundaries.

I am

proud to number among my friends and colleagues a number of
officers and members of the Association.
Your membership in this organization enables you to keep upto-date on recent developments in foreign, comparative and
international law.

Through your meetings, as well as through the

American Journal of Comparative Law and your own Newsletter, you
exchange ideas that are valuable to you individually in your work
in the international arena.

You also provide important public

service as an Association by giving your views to the U.S. State
Department with regard to treaties and private law conventions
being considered by our government.

Your public service also is

manifested by your status as a Non-Governmental organization at
the United Nations and by your participation in joint educational
programs with other organizations concerned with international
law.

A little later, I shall propose a new project for this

85

venerable Association.

This project will cause you to be of

service to another important institution -- the federal courts of
the United States.
The global economy has brought an increasing variety of
foreign law issues to the federal courts.

Indeed, one

international commercial transaction may implicate the law of
several nations.

Aside from foreign law issues arising in cases

relating to foreign trade, federal courts throughout this nation
are faced daily with immigration matters, tort claims, public law
disputes, arbitration enforcement proceedings, domestic relation
suits and even criminal cases that call for the determination and
application of foreign law.

These cases are beginning to form a

significant part of the business of the federal courts.

And yet

the tendency of the federal courts is to duck and run when
presented with issues of foreign law.

Why should this be so,

when we federal judges have at hand so many methods that we may
employ to resolve foreign law issues?
lies in our fear of the unknown.

I think that the answer

Let me give you an example.

Less than two months ago, a panel of my court was confronted
with an appeal from a district court judgment denying relief
under a federal statute that allows for discovery in aid of
foreign litigation. 1

The litigation for which assistance was

sought was pending in France.

The district court held, in light

of the limited discovery allowed in France, that it would be
contrary to French law and policy to permit the discovery to go
forward here.

The majority of the panel disagreed with the
2

district court and reversed, concluding that discovery assistance
should be provided absent specific direction to the contrary by
the foreign court.

The majority saw the purpose of the statute

as "promoting efficiency in international litigation and
persuading other nations, by example, to do the same. 112

I, for

one, have never assumed that it was the duty of our federal
courts to persuade foreign courts to do anything.

I certainly

would never urge them to adopt our discovery practices.

The

dissenter in the case thought that.the discovery procedures
allowed by the statute should not be used to evade disclosure
limitations imposed by foreign tribunals.
I do not say whether I agree with the majority or the
dissent in this particular case.

I refer to it only to draw your

attention to some of the language in the majority opinion.
Hearken to a portion of the rationale:
The record reveals that this litigation
became a battle-by-affidavit of international
legal experts and resulted in the district
court's admittedly "superficial" ruling on
French law. •
We think that it is unwise
-- as well as in tension with the aims of
[the statute] -- for district judges to try
to glean the accepted practices and attitudes
of other nations from what are likely to be
conflicting and, perhaps, biased
interpretations of foreign law. 3
I suggest that this is the language of uncertainty, of
avoidance, and of distaste for foreign law.

But I think that the

real kicker is in the first sentence of the majority opinion,
where the issue is stated thus:
This case raises the question of the
degree to which federal district courts, in
3

deciding whether to order discovery under
[the statute] in aid of foreign litigation,
should delve into the mysteries of foreign
law. 4
The mysteries of foreign law!

What an interesting observation in

an era in which the law of foreign nations is so much with us in
the federal courts!

Be assured that I am not criticizing in any

way my distinguished colleague who authored the opinion.

He was,

after all, Dean of the Yale Law School until he recently joined
us.

I use his language only to demonstrate that foreign law has

not been welcomed in our federal courts.
Our haste to avoid confrontation with foreign law leads us
into some strange decisions.

For example, a panel of my court

some years back held as follows:
While • • • a court is still permitted
to apply foreign law even if not requested by
a party, we believe that the law of the forum
may be applied here, where the parties did
not at trial take the position that
plaintiffs were required to prove their
claims under Vietnamese law, even though the
forum's choice of law rule would have called
for application of foreign law. 5
It is strange indeed for a court to consciously apply the wrong
law, based on the position taken by the parties, while
acknowledging a discretionary authority to apply the right law.
Such an approach with regard to questions of domestic law would
be highly unusual.
The decision that I used as my example, Vishipco Line v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, was spawned by an action brought by
Vietnamese corporations and individuals to recover funds
deposited in the Saigon branch of the Chase Manhattan Bank.
4

The

bank had closed the branch following the Communist takeover and
argued that it was not obligated to make good on the deposits for
a number of reasons.

In another bizarre twist in that opinion,

Vietnamese law was applied to Chase's affirmative defenses.
panel reasoned as follows:

The

"While Chase invoked foreign law

• with respect to its own affirmative defenses only, neither
party invoked foreign law with respect to Chase's basic
obligations to its depositors
That case still is cited as precedent by the district courts
in this circuit for the proposition that forum law should be
applied where the parties do not provide the court with the
appropriate foreign law.

Just last year, a district court in the

Southern District was confronted with claims that revolved around
a contract providing that any disputes regarding its terms would
be governed by Malaysian law.

Citing the Vishipco case, the

district court noted the failure of the parties to provide it
with the applicable Malaysian legal principles, "deem[ed) the
parties to have acquiesced in the application of local law and
hence look[ed] to pertinent authority within the forum. 117
The failure of the parties to establish foreign law also
results in the application of the law of the forum in many other
circuits. 8

My own view of the matter is that a court has the

affirmative obligation to seek out the applicable foreign law
whether the parties have established that law or not.

Let me be

clear about any disagreements that I might have with some of the
decisions made by panels of my court in regard to the reception
5

of foreign law.

Like all other judges of the court, I am bound

by the precedent created by the panels.

Our practice is that

only an in bane court or a panel decision circulated to the
entire court and not objected to can change precedent. 9
We do have a federal rule, of course, that requires a party
who intends to raise an issue concerning the law of a foreign
country to give notice of that intention through pleadings or
other reasonable written notice. 10

I refer, of course, to Rule

44.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which my scholarly friend,
District Judge Milton Pollack, discussed with you at some length
when he spoke to this Association on the subject "Proof of
Foreign Law" back in 1978. 11

Rule 44.1 provides that "[t]he

court, in determining foreign law, may consider any relevant
material or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted
by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence."
This clearly provides the federal courts with a tremendous amount
of flexibility in ascertaining foreign law.

It is just too bad

that they do not use it!
Rule 44.1, originally adopted in 1966, concludes with a very
important sentence and it is this: "The court's determination
shall be treated as a ruling on a question of law."

This

provision marked a vast change from earlier federal law, which
treated foreign law as a fact question to be pleaded and proved,
sometimes to the satisfaction of a jury! 12

Because decisions on

foreign law were considered findings of fact, they could be
resolved on appeal only if clearly erroneous. 13
6

Now, the

decisions on foreign law are specifically designated as rulings
of law and thus may be reviewed on appeal de novo. 14
It appears that some federal courts still have not gotten
the word and continue to impose upon the parties a factual burden
of proof of foreign law.

In a case decided in the Southern

District just two years ago, the court held that "[f]oreign law
is a question of fact which must be proved. 1115

The court

observed that affidavits of experts on Polish law were
unsatisfactory and decided that a hearing would be required to
decide the issues.

Although the court certainly was entitled to

take testimony, its decision on Polish law ultimately would be a
legal one, not a factual one.

One commentator has opined that

foreign law implicates a mixture of fact and law under Rule 44.1.
(

He has characterized foreign law as "a tertium genus, a third
category, between fact and law. 1116
decision as purely one of law.

I disagree and see the

Because I have this view, I think

that it becomes the duty of the court to find and apply the
relevant foreign law as soon as it becomes apparent to the court
that foreign law governs.
Accordingly, although it is highly desirable that the
parties give notice under Rule 44.1 of the existence of an issue
of foreign law at the earliest possible time, I do not think such
notice is essential to bring the issue into the case.

There are

many courts that have considered failure to give adequate notice
of a foreign law issue another reason for applying domestic
law. 17

Among those courts is my own, the Second Circuit Court
7

of Appeals.

In Clarkson Co. Ltd. v. Shaheen, 18 a panel of my

court said that it was acceptable for the district court to apply
New York law in determining the obligations of the directors of a
Canadian corporation.

The reason given was that no party claimed

that Canadian law was applicable, and each party "seems to have
assumed that New York law governs. 1119

This approach puts me in

mind of a case that I encountered in my early days as a traveling
rural trial lawyer.

The case was an action to recover the price

of some lumber that the plaintiff had sold to the defendant.
When my adversary and I appeared for a pre-trial conference
before the elderly county judge who was to hear the case, we
advised the judge that the sale of goods at issue was governed by
the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code.
forget his response:

I shall never

"I have not yet learned the Uniform

commercial Code," he said, "and I would like you both to
stipulate to try this case under the old law."

My adversary and

I thought it best to adjourn the case so it could be heard by a
judge who was more current on the law.

I am sure you see the

analogy with the approach to foreign law taken by some federal
courts.
In the past, courts have indulged in a variety of what I
call fictitious presumptions concerning the governing law in
situations where foreign law obviously is applicable but the
parties have not pleaded or established it.

One author has

listed these presumptions as follows: "that the foreign law is
the same as the forum's common law, that foreign law is identical
8

to the forum law, that foreign law is based on generally
recognized principles of civilized nations, and finally, that the
party by not proving the foreign law has essentially acquiesced
to the forum law. 1120

I am particularly amused by the

"principles of civilized nations" presumption because it seems to
me so much easier to ascertain the law of one nation than to go
to the trouble of identifying a rule common to all civilized
nations.
thing.

Presumptions just are not substitutes for the real
By now, you are aware of the fact that I consider it the

duty of the federal courts, both trial and appellate, not only to
identify issues of foreign law independently but to ascertain the

(

correct law and apply it.

Certainly, Rule 44.1 provides us with

many ways to get it right.

We must get all the help we can from

the lawyers in a case, of course, but we must assure ourselves
that we have the right law to apply.

That is the way we do it in

regard to domestic law and that is the way we must do it in
regard to foreign law.
I think that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals had it
right when it stated that, in determining questions of foreign
law, both trial and appellate courts must research and analyze
the law independently. 21

In the case in which that statement

was made, the Seventh Circuit undertook its own detailed analysis
of the Spanish law relating to the right of a shareholder of a
corporation to sue for injury to the corporation.

The court

quoted with approval in the course of its decision this statement
by a commentator: '"All too often counsel will do an inadequate
9

job of researching and presenting foreign law or will attempt to
prove it in such a partisan fashion that the court is obliged to
go beyond their offerings.

11122

While I am in agreement with the

idea that the courts must do their own analysis, I do not agree
that the work of the attorneys often is inadequate.

In most

cases, the foreign law is completely and fairly presented on all
sides, and the court can proceed to do its job.

I once wrote an

opinion for a panel of our court that revolved around the
Ecuadorian Law of Guaranty and found the foreign law well and
fully presented. 23

It is always a pleasure to have a case where

the lawyers are so helpful, whether the case involves domestic
law or foreign law.
In fact, our federal courts have shown a commendable ability
(

to get their hands around foreign law when fully briefed on the
issues.

A few years back, a judge in the Southern District of

New York had no trouble in identifying and applying the law of
Kenya in an action to recover damages for injuries sustained in a
rhinoceros attack in Kenya. 24

The defendant was not the

rhinoceros, but ABC Television, which had elicited the assistance
of the plaintiff, a former big game hunter and safari guide, in
making a documentary film.

The plaintiff alleged that a

photographer acted recklessly and provoked a rhinoceros cow to
charge while defending her calf.

The court denied a motion for

partial summary judgment made by the defendants.
A panel of my court just last year had no trouble in finding
that a ruling of the Paris Court of Appeals conferring exequatur
10

on an arbitration award was within the category of judgments
enforceable under the New York Money-Judgment Recognition Act. 25
In deciding that the decree conferring exequatur was the
functional equivalent of a French judgment for the sums specified
in the award, we had the benefit of affidavits from a retired
judge of the highest tribunal in France, the Cour de Cassation.
A few years back, my court, apparently fully informed on the
issue, dealt with the Dominican law of affiliation in an action
brought against the Immigration and Naturalization service
challenging a denial of preferential immigration status. 26

And

in a case arising out of the purchase of furs at an auction in
Finland, a Southern District court applied Finnish law without
difficulty after examining the affidavits of Finnish attorneys
(

submitted by both sides. 27

The court also found in that case

that the foreign law did not conflict with a strong public policy
of the forum, an interesting issue that I may address on another
occasion.
But what if we are not confident that we are fully informed
on the foreign law, and what if we are not informed at all?

It

seems clear that both our trial and appellate courts can turn to
the lawyers for information.

That is just what a southern

District court did on a motion for summary judgment in a case
that turned on the enforceability of contracts under Italian
law. 28

It was not disputed that Italian law governed, but

neither side provided the necessary information to enable the
court to make the correct decision.
11

In a written opinion, the

court was first constrained to disabuse counsel of the notion
that the issue was a factual one to be resolved at trial.

The

court then directed the plaintiff to file within twenty days "a
legal memorandum and accompanying documentation supporting its
proposition that valid contracts existed under Italian law. 1129
Defendant was afforded fifteen days in which to reply.

I think

that this was a very effective use of court resources, because
the court was able to call upon its most important resource -the lawyers in the case.
Recalling the text of Rule 44.1, a court may consider any
relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or not
submitted by a party or whether or not admissible in evidence.
This certainly gives us a much broader spectrum than we have in
identifying domestic law.

One treatise has listed the variety of

sources and materials that federal courts have had reference to
in ascertaining foreign law.

These include the written or oral

testimony of experts, home-grown and foreign; copies of a foreign
country's code or laws, including statutory provisions of the
relevant law in the original or in translation; reference works;
decisions of foreign courts; law reviews and treatises; and the
reports of special masters expert in foreign law and fluent in
the foreign language. 30
In the end, whatever the source, we federal judges must
ourselves be certain that we have it right and that we do not
allow a bad result just because we are on unfamiliar ground.
lot of what I now deal with in the Court of Appeals was
12

A

unfamiliar to me before I became a federal judge, but I cannot,
in the manner of that old country judge, avoid the responsibility
of deciding cases on the basis of correct law.

I must use all

the resources available to me to resolve the question.
In most of the foreign law cases that I have participated
in, the affidavits of experts have been supplied, along with
copies of pertinent laws and codes.

These have proved sufficient

to allow me to make up my own mind about the applicable foreign
law after completing any research that I have considered
necessary.

Foreign law experts come from many places.

In a case

now sub judice before a panel on which I am serving, a Columbia
Law School professor and a former judge of the Supreme Court of
the Netherlands have given affidavits of opinion on the Dutch law
of civil conspiracy.

Although the opinions differ, both

affidavits are straightforward and helpful.
I do not agree with those who consider an expert
automatically suspect because he or she is retained by one side
or the other. 31

If we think that we are getting some "junk"

foreign law from an expert, we can take a leaf from the book
given to us by the Supreme court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals. 32

In that case, it was determined that a

federal judge should act as a gatekeeper in deciding whether to
admit scientific evidence.

I think that a federal judge can also

act as a gatekeeper in deciding whether to accept the foreign law
opinion of an expert.

Testimony will sometimes be required to

determine whether an expert's opinion is reliable or relevant.
13

I

am not greatly enamored of taking testimony from a foreign law
expert, however, and think that it would be necessary only in a
rare case.
It seems to me that the federal courts should make more use
of court-appointed experts in all kinds of cases where an expert
opinion would be helpful.

I think that in close questions of

foreign law, where experts engaged by the parties are in serious
disagreement, the court should appoint its own expert in an
effort to close the gap.

Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of

Evidence provides that "[t]he court may on its own or on the
motion of any party enter an order to show cause why expert
witnesses should not be appointed, and may request the parties to
submit nominations."

The issue for the expert may be clarified

at a pre-trial conference and the expert's findings must be
provided to the parties, who may depose or cross-examine the
expert.

The compensation of the court-appointed expert must be

paid "by the parties in such proportion and at such time as the
court directs, and thereafter charged in like manner as
costs. 1133
The use of a court-appointed expert is a highly desirable
tool for ascertaining the governing foreign law and, as one
author has stated, "[p]ersuasive advice submitted to the court
may prompt a stipulation that settles the foreign law
question. 1134

The elaborate system provided by Rule 706 for

testing the opinion of a court-appointed expert means that we are
pretty sure of getting the foreign law right in a case where such
14

an opinion is given.

It does not by any means, however, divest

us of our independent duty of research, for the responsibility of
arriving at a correct decision is ours and ours alone. 35

Expert

opinion, whether from the parties or from a court-appointed
expert is only one way for us to get there.

And get there we

must, without applying the law of the forum when it does not
apply, without utilizing fictitious presumptions, without
regarding the search for foreign law as an arcane enterprise
whose mysteries we cannot fathom, and without evading the
responsibility that every court in this nation has -- to find the
law and apply it.
And that brings me back to the American Foreign Law
Association, an organization whose members include the foremost
foreign law experts in our nation.

I suggest that you undertake

this project: prepare a booklet of your members who are willing
to act as experts for cases in the federal courts.

For each of

these, specify the foreign law of his or her expertise, together
with educational background, professional experience and present
affiliations.

Distribute these booklets to the federal trial and

appellate courts throughout the nation and to those members of
the bar engaged in international practice.

Help us assure a

warmer reception for foreign law in the federal courts.
dispel the mysteries of foreign law.

.(
15

Help us

Help us get it right.
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